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VOLUNTARY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
PLANS AFTER WEBER
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In 1979 the Supreme Court addressed for the first time the issue
whether a private employer's voluntarily enacted affirmative action
plan discriminated against a nonminority employee in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 The Court held in United Steel-
workers v. Weber2 that Title VII's prohibition against race discrimina-
tion does not necessarily preclude affirmative action plans enacted vol-
untarily by private employers.3 Rather, Weber permits such race-
conscious programs if they are initiated to correct "manifest racial im-
balances in traditionally segregated job categories."" The Court's rea-
soning implies that an employer that enacts a race-conscious plan with-
out being able to demonstrate both a current underrepresentation of
minorities and a history of segregation in the relevant job category will
be found liable if a Title VII discrimination suit is brought by a
nonminority plaintiff.
Affirmative action plans were challenged in two recent cases on
the ground that the employers failed to establish that their plans were
implemented in order to correct underrepresentation in traditionally
segregated job categories. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 5 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that statistical evidence of
t B.S. 1983, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. Candidate 1986,
University of Pennsylvania.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
2 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
* See id. at 197.
' Id. In addition to the Weber Court's primary concern with the circumstances
under which an employer may implement an affirmative action program, the Court
mentioned several considerations regarding the structure of a valid affirmative action
program. The Weber plan was permissible because it was temporary and did not "un-
necessarily trammel the interests of the white employees" or create an "absolute bar to
the advancement of white employees." Id. at 208. There has been much litigation con-
cerning these structural requirements. See, e.g., Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d
894, 911-12 (3d Cir. 1984); Bushey v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 733 F.2d
220, 228 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 803 (1985); Bratton v. City of De-
troit, 704 F.2d 878, 897 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); Tangren
v. Wackenhut Servs., 658 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916
(1982). This Comment, however, is concerned only with the question of when an em-
ployer may enact a plan without violating Title VII.
5 770 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1985).
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entrenched underrepresentation of women in the Santa Clara County
Transportation Agency's skilled craft positions was sufficient to justify
voluntary implementation of an affirmative action program.' Two days
later, in Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend 7 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that statistical evidence of under-
representation of blacks in the South Bend Fire Department was insuf-
ficient to justify a voluntary affirmative action program; the court held
that an employer must produce additional evidence of past discrimina-
tion in order to defend against a Title VII discrimination suit brought
by a nonminority plaintiff.8
This disagreement between circuit courts is of great importance to
all employers.9 Unless the Supreme Court resolves the controversy over
what evidence is adequate to insulate affirmative action plans from Ti-
tle VII attack, countless existing plans could be challenged and other
employers could be deterred from implementing affirmative action pro-
grams. This Comment analyzes whether Weber requires an employer
to show more than statistical evidence of underrepresentation of minori-
ties'0 in its work force to justify the implementation of an affirmative
I See id. at 758. Of the agency's 238 skilled craft workers, none was female. Id. at
754.
z 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984), petition for cert. filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3896 (U.S.
June 10, 1985) (No. 84-1936). The decision in Johnson was originally handed down
on December 4, 1984-two days prior toJanowiak-and then modified on September
5, 1985. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 748 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1984), modi-
fied, 770 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1985). For a discussion of a significant amendment to the
original Johnson decision, see infra text accompanying note 77.
" See Janowiak, 750 F.2d at 562.
" The Weber Court limited its holding to private employers. See 443 U.S. at 200.
The two cases on which this Comment focuses involve public employers. See Johnson,
770 F.2d at 753-54;Janowiak, 750 F.2d at 558. In 1972 Congress amended Title VII
to include public employers within the statutory definition of "employer." See Pub. L.
No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982)). Since Weber,
a number of decisions, in addition to Johnson and Janowiak, have applied Weber's
guidelines to public agencies in Title VII suits. See, e.g., Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704
F.2d 878, 884 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); La Riviere v.
EEOC, 682 F.2d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court recently declined an
opportunity to address the question whether Weber can constitutionally be extended to
public employers. See Bushey v. New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 105 S. Ct. 803
(1985), denying cert. to 733 F.2d 220, 227 n.8 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding that Weber
applies to public employers). The three Justices who dissented from the denial of cer-
tiorari noted that the denial may have been based on the petitioner's failure to press the
fourteenth amendment equal protection argument on appeal. See Bushey, 105 S. Ct. at
806 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The question of the application of Weber to affirmative
action plans enacted by public employers remains unanswered and is not addressed in
this Comment. Even if the Court were to rule that Weber should not be extended to
public employers, the issue addressed in this Comment would remain crucial to all
private employers that wish to enact affirmative action plans.
10 In this Comment the terms "minority" and "nonminority" encompass sex-based
classifications.
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action plan. Part I presents an analysis of Weber that considers both
the standard the Supreme Court adopted and the options it rejected.
Part II discusses the decisions in Janowiak and Johnson, highlighting
the conflicts, between the circuit courts' readings of Weber. In Part III
the Comment explores these conflicting interpretations and suggests
that both interpretations are supportable if considered solely within the
parameters of the Supreme Court's opinion.
Finally, Part IV looks beyond the language of Weber to offer a
resolution of this conflict. By defining the Weber standard in terms of
the standards the Court rejected, and by presenting a comparison to the
accepted use of statistics in Title VII actions brought by minority
plaintiffs, the Comment concludes, as did the Ninth Circuit in John-
son,"1 that an employer may comply with Weber by offering statistical
data demonstrating manifest underrepresentation of minorities in its
work force. The presentation of this evidence should create a strong
presumption that the job category in question has traditionally been
segregated. The plaintiff would then have the burden of demonstrating
that because of methodological flaws the statistics do not support such
an inference.
I. Weber AND THE PATHS NOT CHOSEN
A. The Fifth Circuit's Decision
To understand the true import of the Supreme Court's holding in
Weber, it is first necessary to examine the majority and dissenting opin-
ions in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' consideration of the case. In
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.,12 the Fifth Circuit re-
viewed the affirmative action plan Kaiser had adopted as part of a
master collective bargaining agreement with the United Steelworkers of
America. 3 The plan set hiring goals for blacks in the skilled
craftworker positions in Kaiser's plants in order to equalize the per-
centages of blacks in the skilled craftworker positions and the local la-
bor force.1 4 To accomplish these goals the plan provided that Kaiser
establish on-the-job training programs to teach unskilled workers the
skills necessary to become craftworkers, reserving fifty percent of the
"' Two other courts have approved the use of statistics to satisfy Weber. See Setser
v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 968 & n.6 (8th Cir. 1981); Tangren v. Wackenhut
Servs., 480 F. Supp. 539, 547 (D. Nev. 1979), affid, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
12 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
"S See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum, 563 F.2d at 218.
14 See id.
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openings in these programs for blacks.' 5
The court ruled that Kaiser's affirmative action plan violated the
rights of nonminority workers under Title VII because Kaiser had pro-
duced no evidence that it had discriminated in the past, and therefore
could not justify having implemented the plan. 6 The court stated that
Kaiser could not implement an affirmative action plan as a remedy for
"societal discrimination." Instead, it could employ racial preferences
only in order to remedy an imbalance that had resulted from its own
past discriminatory acts.1
7
In dissent Judge Wisdom warned that the majority's holding
spelled the end of voluntary compliance with Title VII.' 8 He reasoned
that the majority rule forced the employer to walk a "high tightrope
without a net."' 9 On one side of the rope, if the employer admitted to
past discriminatory acts in order to justify an affirmative action plan, it
would face the possibility of liability to minorities harmed by the ad-
mitted past discrimination. 0 On the other side, the employer would
risk liability to nonminorities if it adopted an affirmative action plan
without meeting the majority's requirement that it admit to prior dis-
crimination."' Judge Wisdom suggested that employers would not be
forced onto the tightrope if the majority's holding were replaced by an
"arguable violation" test. Under this standard, any reasonable affirma-
tive action plan enacted in response to an employer's arguable viola-
18 See id.
18 See id. at 224.
17 See id. at 224-25.
18 See id. at 230 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). Later in his opinion, Judge Wisdom
tempered his prediction slightly, stating that the majority's standard would lead to "less
voluntary compliance with Title VII." Id.
19 Id.
2 See id. Observing that an employer has no incentive to prove past discrimina-
tion, one commentator has suggested that minorities and women who would benefit
from affirmative action plans be joined as parties when affirmative action plans are
attacked by nonminority employees. See Comment, The Distorted Adversarial Posture
of Title VII Affirmative Action Challenges, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1543, 1556-68 (1980).
These employees would have every incentive to establish past discrimination in order to
justify the voluntary implementation of their employer's affirmative action plan. One
difficulty with this approach is that employers may still be reluctant to adopt affirma-
tive action plans if past employer discrimination will be established in court, even if by
another party.
21 See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum, 563 F.2d at 230 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun later pointed out in his concurring opinion in the Supreme Court's
consideration of the case that employers faced yet another problem on the minority side
of Wisdom's tightrope. If, recognizing the two dangers discussed in the text, the em-
ployer decided to forgo implementing an affirmative action plan, it would be precluded
from attempting to mitigate any damages it had caused victims of its past discrimina-
tion. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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tions of Title VII would be lawful."
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
Although Justice Blackmun endorsed Judge Wisdom's "arguable
violation" theory in his Weber concurrence,23 a majority of the Supreme
Court adopted neither the arguable violation standard nor the past dis-
crimination requirement.24 The majority began its analysis by discuss-
ing the facts surrounding the operation of the plan at Kaiser's plant.
After stating that Kaiser had long hired as craftworkers only persons
who had had prior craft experience,25 the Court took judicial notice of
the historical exclusion of workers from craft unions on racial
grounds.26 Because of this historical segregation, the Court concluded
that blacks lacked the credentials that Kaiser required for the
craftworkers it sought to hire. As a result, there was a gross disparity
between the percentage of blacks in Kaiser's skilled craft work force
and the percentage of blacks in the labor force in the area of Kaiser's
plant.
27
Proceeding to the merits of the claim, the Court emphasized that
Kaiser was a private party and had voluntarily adopted the plan to
eliminate "traditional patterns of racial segregation. 28 In this context,
the prohibitions against racial discrimination in sections 703(a) and (d)
of Title VII29 could not be read literally. Rather, these prohibitions had
22 See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum, 563 F.2d at 230 (Wisdom, J., dissenting).
Judge Wisdom did not attempt to give content to the phrase "arguable violation."
However, he reviewed the record and suggested that Kaiser had committed "three pos-
sible or probable violations" of Title VII. Id. at 231-32.
23 See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
24 See id. at 209.
25 See id. at 198.
26 See id. at 198 n.1.
27 See id. at 198-99.
28 Id. at 201.
29 Section 703(a) provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or to refuse hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
Section 703(d) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor
1986]
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to be read "against the background of the legislative history of Title
VII and the historical context from which the Act arose."30
In its analysis of the legislative history of the Act, the Court
quoted from the remarks of several legislators, 1 including Senator
Humphrey who stated that Title VII was enacted to "'open employ-
ment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which have been tradi-
tionally closed to them.'"32 The Court also quoted a Report of the
House Committee on the Judiciary indicating that Congress anticipated
that Title VII would promote voluntary resolution of the problem of
discrimination. 3 The Court reasoned from the legislative history that
Congress could not have intended to forbid private employers "from
taking effective steps to accomplish the goal that Congress designed Ti-
tle VII to achieve.
s3 4
As further support for its reading of the statute, the Court noted
that section 703(j) states that nothing contained in Title VII "'shall be
interpreted to require any employer . . . to grant preferential treat-
ment . . . to any group because of' a de facto racial imbalance in the
employer's workforce."35 The use of the word "require" instead of the
phrase "require or permit," reasoned the Court, indicated that Con-
organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprentice-
ship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training pro-
grams, to discriminate against any individual because of his race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or employment in, any
program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1982).
'0 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201.
31 See id. at 202-07.
32 Id. at 203 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey)).
83 Id. at 203-04 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963),
reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2393). The House Report
stated that "[t]here is reason to believe . . . that national leadership provided by the
enactment of Federal legislation dealing with the most troublesome problems will create
an atmosphere conducive to voluntary or local resolution of other forms of discrimina-
tion." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2393.
a United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 204.
s Id. at 205-06 (quoting Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 257 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982)). Section 7030) provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-man-
agement committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treat-
ment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbal-
ance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of
persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by
any employer . . . in comparison with the total number or percentage of
persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any commu-
[Vol. 134:457
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gress did not intend to forbid voluntary race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion plans.36
The Court concluded that Title VII left to private employers an
area of discretion in which they were free "voluntarily to adopt affirm-
ative action plans to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in tradi-
tionally segregated job categories."'3 7 In so holding, the Court rejected
both the Fifth Circuit majority's "past discrimination" approach and
Judge Wisdom's "arguable violation" approach.
II. THE DECISIONS IN Janowiak AND Johnson
A. Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend
In Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend,38 a white male who
had been denied employment with the city fire department because of
the operation of the city's affirmative action program challenged the
legality of that program under Title VII. In the court's words, the chal-
lenge presented the issue whether "the City of South Bend could adopt
an affirmative action program for its Police and Fire Departments
solely upon the basis of a finding that a disparity existed between the
percentage of minorities in the population of South Bend and the per-
centage of minorities in the Departments."3"
The Seventh Circuit pointed to the Weber Court's judicial notice
of the craft unions' history of excluding blacks from membership, and
concluded that in Weber the Court "relied upon more than the glaring
statistical, disparity between the percentage of black craftworkers em-
ployed and the percentage of blacks in the workforce."" Based on this
reasoning the Janowiak court read Weber as requiring that an affirma-
tive action program be based upon a finding of "past discrimination."41
nity, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any
community, State, section, or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982).
" See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 206. The Court also argued that
its reading of the legislative history was fully consistent with the legislators' concern
that the federal government not interfere with traditional management prerogatives,
specifically the freedom to address racial imbalance in the work force. See id. at 206-
07.
37 Id. at 209.
38 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984).
39 Id. at 558.
40 Id. at 562 (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 198-99).
41 See id. The Seventh Circuit did not specifically state whether "past discrimina-
tion" meant past discrimination by the employer or past societal discrimination. There
can be little doubt, however, that the court was referring to societal discrimination; to
hold otherwise would have directly contradicted the Supreme Court's holding in Weber.
Since the Janowiak opinion cited and quoted Weber at length, it is likely that the
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The court further stated that Weber "hinged on" the judicial no-
tice of the exclusion of blacks from craft unions,42 and cited its own
statement in a prior case that "statistical data constitutes 'the first step
in assessing whether [an] employer decides properly to institute an af-
firmative action plan.' -43 Under Weber and its own previous decision,
the court concluded, an employer could not adopt an affirmative action
program "in response to a finding of past discrimination based solely
upon a statistical disparity.
44
B. Johnson v. Transportation Agency
In Johnson v. Transportation Agency,45 a male employee of the
Santa Clara County Transportation Agency brought an employment
discrimination action alleging that he was illegally denied promotion on
the basis of sex because of the operation of the agency's affirmative
action program. Rejecting the district court's concern that the plan was
not addressed to breaking down entrenched patterns of discrimination,
the court determined that in order to justify an affirmative action pro-
gram, "an employer need not show its own history of purposeful dis-
crimination. It is sufficient for the employer to show a conspicuous im-
balance in its work force."'46 Discussing why statistics alone are enough
to justify an affirmative action program, the court stated:
Statistics are extremely useful in showing a conspicuous
work force imbalance. We note particularly the difficulty
that may confront an employer whose plan is intended to
remedy discrimination resulting from societal norms. Some
forms of discrimination are so subtle or so accepted that they
defy proof other than by statistics.
4
7
Thus, the Johnson court, unlike the court injanowiak, held that statis-
phrase "past discrimination" was used to refer to past societal discrimination.
42 See id.
43 Id. at 563 (quoting Lehman v. Yellow Freight Sys., 651 F.2d 520, 527 (7th
Cir. 1981)).
44 Id.
45 770 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1985).
46 Id. at 758 (citation and footnote omitted).
47 Id. At this point, the Johnson court cryptically referred to the Supreme Court's
taking judicial notice of the historical exclusion of blacks from craft unions. See id.
(citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 198 n.1). Perhaps the court cited
Weber's footnote one to show that while in some cases of discrimination statistics will
be the only available means of proof, in rare cases it may be possible to establish tradi-
tionally segregated job categories by other means. The Johnson court explicitly held,
however, that statistics are sufficient to establish a traditionally segregated job category.
See id.
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tical evidence of minority underrepresentation in the relevant job cate-
gory was sufficient to justify an employer's affirmative action plan.
III. INTERPRETING THE Weber STANDARD
A. Arguable Violations Versus Traditionally Segregated Job
Categories
The Seventh Circuit's holding in Janowiak, that proof of under-
representation of minorities in a job category is insufficient to show that
the job category had traditionally been segregated, ignores the Supreme
Court's rejection of the "prior discrimination" and "arguable violation"
approaches suggested by the majority and dissenting opinions in the
Fifth Circuit's consideration of Weber.
Judge Wisdom had proposed the "arguable violation" theory be-
cause an actual prior discrimination requirement would be too harsh on
employers."8 The Supreme Court, however, imposed an even lighter
burden on employers by requiring that they show only that the job
category in question was traditionally segregated.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Weber, in which he spe-
cifically joined the opinion of the Court49 but explained that he none-
theless preferred the arguable violation standard,5 ° discussed the differ-
ences between the "arguable violation" and "traditionally segregated
job category" standards: "'Traditionally segregated job categories,'
where they exist, sweep far more broadly than the class of 'arguable
violations.' "51 Justice Blackmun preferred the "narrow" arguable vio-
lation approach and criticized the Court's "expansive approach."52
According to Justice Blackmun, the Court's approach "depart[ed]
from the 'arguable violations' approach [in] that it measure[d] an indi-
vidual employer's capacity for affirmative action solely in terms of a
statistical disparity."53 Justice Blackmun concluded that he could ac-
cept the majority's more expansive reading of the statute precisely be-
cause he recognized that the arguable violation standard would proba-
bly be met in practice by statistical evidence:
To make the "arguable violation" standard work, it would
have to be set low enough to permit the employer to prove it
without obligating himself to pay a damage award. The in-
18 See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
"I See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
50 See id. at 211.
51 Id. at 212.
52 See id. at 212-13.
53 Id. at 213 (emphasis added).
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evitable tendency would be to avoid hairsplitting litigation by
simply concluding that a mere disparity between the racial
composition of the employer's work force and the composi-
tion of the qualified local labor force would be an "arguable
violation," even though actual liability could not be estab-
lished on that basis alone.
5
1
Although the majority of the Court might not have agreed with
Justice Blackmun's analysis of the differences between the "tradition-
ally segregated job category" and "arguable violation" standards, there
is support in the majority opinion for the proposition that an employer
can establish a traditionally segregated job category without having to
prove an arguable violation of Title VII. The Court specifically stated
that its approach should not be read "to suggest that the freedom of an
employer to undertake race-conscious affirmative action efforts depends
on whether or not his effort is motivated by fear of liability under Title
VII.,,55
In light of the clear progression from the Fifth Circuit's require-
ment of an actual violation to Judge Wisdom's lesser requirement of an
arguable violation to the Supreme Court's even more lenient require-
ment that the employer show a traditionally segregated job category,
Weber appears to require no more than statistical evidence of en-
trenched underrepresentation in the relevant job category. However,
Weber's footnote one, in which the Court took judicial notice of the
historical exclusion of blacks from craft unions,56 suggests that Weber
may require more than mere statistical evidence of underrepresentation
of minorities.
B. The Conflict over Weber's Footnote One
The judicial notice taken in Weber was based on six cases, a num-
ber of books, and several reports by the United States Commission on
Civil Rights. From these sources, the Court concluded that "blacks had
long been excluded from craft unions."'57 Thus, while employers need
not implicate themselves in justifying the creation of affirmative action
5 Id. at 214.
55 Id. at 208 n.8. Judge Wallace, in his separate opinion in Johnson, misread the
Court's rejection of the arguable violation standard, concluding erroneously that the
Weber test is more stringent on an employer than the arguable violation requirement
would have been. See Johnson, 770 F.2d at 764 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The Johnson majority observed this error made by the dissent. See
id. at 758 n.5.
5' See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 198 n.1.
57 Id. at 198 & n.1.
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plans, Weber arguably requires documentary evidence of societal or in-
dustrial discrimination in addition to evidence of historical under-
representation. As noted above, the Janowiak court seized on Weber's
judicial notice as evidence that "the Court relied upon more than the
glaring statistical disparity between the percentage of black
craftworkers employed and the percentage of blacks in the
workforce."""
By giving such import to footnote one, it is possible to read Weber
as requiring employers to gather case law and other literature demon-
strating historical segregation. If this standard were applied in future
cases concerning voluntarily enacted affirmative action programs, some
employers, such as those that employ craftworkers, police officers, col-
lege professors, and arguably all public employees, could rely on judi-
cial notice taken in existing case law.59 For other employers, however,
it would be considerably more difficult to locate such information. 0
Should the agency in Johnson have been required to undertake a
search of case law for judicial findings of historical discrimination
against female road maintenance workers? Would it have sufficed to
produce cases finding discrimination against women in blue collar occu-
pations or in the government in general? While it appears that the
Janowiak court would have wanted some form of additional proof, for
the court in Johnson it was sufficient that the agency had shown that
not one of its 238 skilled craftworkers was a woman. As long as foot-
note one is read in a vacuum, the conflict between the two circuit courts
cannot be resolved.
8 Janowiak, 750 F.2d at 562; see supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
59 See, e.g., United States v. City of Alexandria, 614 F.2d 1358, 1363 n.12 (5th
Cir. 1980) (citing judicial, administrative, and congressional findings of discrimination
by municipal police and fire departments); United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d
1322, 1338 n.29 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing congressional findings of discrimination by
public sector employees), modified, 664 F.2d 435 (1981); Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n
v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 690-91 (6th Cir. 1979) (citing judicial and administrative
findings of unlawful discrimination by law enforcement agencies), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 938 (1981); Cohen v. Community College, 484 F. Supp. 411, 434 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (citing law review articles discussing historical discrimination in higher
education).
60 One commentator noted that "it is a plausible contention that every job classifi-
cation in America today has been traditionally closed to both women and minorities."
Comment, Voluntary Affirmative Action After United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber: Constructing a Peaceful Coexistence Between Title VII and Executive Order
11,246, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1159, 1182 (1980). Had the Weber Court accepted this
proposition, it would have required that an employer show only a present racial imbal-
ance in the relevant job category to justify the employer's affirmative action plan.
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IV. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
The preceding sections of this Comment have demonstrated that
the Weber decision clearly precludes forcing an employer to admit to
having discriminated or arguably discriminated in the past in order to
justify implementing an affirmative action plan. Beyond this, however,
Weber is open to contradictory interpretations. The Court's rejection of
both the "actual discrimination" and "arguable violation" standards
suggested by the Fifth Circuit's majority and dissent indicates that sta-
tistical evidence of current underrepresentation of minorities in the rele-
vant job category is sufficient to meet the requirement of traditional
segregation in that job category. Some courts, however, have read foot-
note one of the Weber majority opinion as suggesting that an employer
must also point to judicial or other findings that industrial or societal
discrimination has operated to keep the relevant job category closed to
minorities.
The solution to this conflict is impossible to discern within the
parameters of Weber alone. The conflict arises because it is unclear
what weight should be given to Weber's footnote one. For theJanowiak
court, the decision in Weber "hinged on" footnote one.61 By examining
the Supreme Court's rulings on the use of statistical evidence of under-
representation in Title VII claims by minority plaintiffs, and by reex-
amining the concerns that led the Court to eschew requiring employers
to prove arguable violations, the solution to this crucial problem can be
determined.
A. An Obvious Answer? A Comparison to the Use of Statistics in
Disparate Treatment Actions
The Supreme Court first set forth the order and allocation of
proof in Title VII "disparate treatment" '62 actions in McDonnell Doug-
61 SeeJanowiak, 750 F.2d at 562.
62 Disparate impact and disparate treatment are the two basic types of liability
under section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). The Court suc-
cinctly described the difference between disparate treatment and disparate impact in
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977):
"Disparate treatment" . . . is the most easily understood type of dis-
crimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than
others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof
of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be
inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. ...
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that
stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment practices that
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
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las Corp. v. Green 3 and later refined these requirements in Texas De-
partment of Community Affairs v. Burdine." In such actions the
plaintiff must first establish a "prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion."' 65 If the plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case, the
burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for having rejected the plaintiff.6 Fi-
nally, should the defendant carry this burden the plaintiff then has an
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legiti-
mate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but
were a pretext for discrimination.
67
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,68 the
Court stated that the government may use statistical evidence of racial
or ethnic imbalance to make out a prima facie case of a pattern or
practice of discrimination:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in
a case such as this one only because such imbalance is often
a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explana-
tion, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory
hiring practices will in time result in a work force more or
less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the
population in the community from which employees are
hired.6"
The Court clarified any ambiguity that may have remained after
business necessity .... Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is
not required under a disparate-impact theory.
Id. at 335 n.15. Under the category of disparate treatment, an additional distinction can
be made between individual disparate treatment, in which an individual claims that she
has been treated less favorably because of her group status, and systemic disparate
treatment, in which a class of individuals or the government alleges a "pattern or prac-
tice" of discrimination. See M. ZIMMER, C. SULLIVAN & R. RICHARDS, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 3-7 (1982).
6- 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
o 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
5 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court suggested that the plaintiff
could accomplish this by showing the following: that she belonged to a racial minority;
that she applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking appli-
cants; that she was rejected despite her qualifications; and that after her rejection the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
the plaintiff's qualifications. See id. The Court emphasized, however, that this was
simply an example of how a plaintiff could make out a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion and was not the only way. See id. n.13.
66 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
87 See id. at 256.
88 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
61 Id. at 340 n.20.
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Teamsters in Hazelwood School District v. United States,7 0 stating that
"[w]here gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone
may . . . constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of
discrimination.1
71
Whether an analogy can be drawn from the use of statistics in a
disparate treatment action brought by the government or minorities to
the use of statistics by an employer trying to satisfy Weber's require-
ments is a difficult question. Several courts, however, have explicitly
drawn this analogy. In Tangren v. Wackenhut Services,72 the court
stated that "[c]ourts have consistently held that statistical evidence is
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination.17 3
The Tangren court concluded that "[ilf such a showing is sufficient to
permit the imposition of legal sanctions, a fortiori, the same showing
should permit an employer and union to adopt a voluntary affirmative
action program.1
7 4
Similar logic was used by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in Setser v. Novack Investment Co." Relying on Weber's rejec-
tion of the arguable violation standard, the court stated that a statistical
showing of a "conspicuous racial imbalance" satisfies Weber "even if
the statistics employed would not be sufficient to show a prima facie
violation of title VII."'7 6 In addition, the Ninth Circuit, in a significant
amendment to its original decision in Johnson, observed that while
Weber does not require that an employer establish an arguable viola-
tion, the statistical evidence in Johnson could have been used to estab-
lish a prima facie case of discrimination.7 7 Unfortunately, however,
none of these courts explained the analogy between the use of statistics
in the Weber context and the use of statistics to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination.
By considering more closely the relationship between the the use
of statistics in disparate treatment actions and the use of statistics in
70 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
71 Id. at 307-08 (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339).
72 480 F. Supp. 539 (D. Nev. 1979), aft'd, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
73 Id. at 547.
74 Id.
75 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1981).
78 Id. at 968 (footnote omitted).
77 770 F.2d at 758 n.5 (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208
n.8). In addition to the three courts, one commentator has suggested, without elaborat-
ing, that "[s]ince . . .an employee can establish a Title VII violation merely by statis-
tically showing underrepresentation of minorities in its work force, an employer should
be permitted to take affirmative action to prevent such a confrontation." Comment,
supra note 60, at 1185.
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actions like Weber,"7 it is possible to develop a line of reasoning that is
implicit in Tangren, Setser, and Johnson. The first premise is that
since the Weber Court refused to require the employer to prove an ar-
guable violation, any proof of an arguable violation would meet the
more lenient Weber test. Second, a prima facie case of discrimination
and an arguable violation as conceived by Judge Wisdom and Justice
Blackmun are functionally equivalent.79 Third, in disparate treatment
Title VII suits, statistics can be used to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. Therefore, statistical disparity evidence satisfies the
Weber standard.
The problem with this logic is that the conclusion does not neces-
sarily follow from the third premise. The conclusion that a conspicuous
disparity has been demonstrated by statistics establishing a prima facie
case of discrimination rests on the assumption that relevant samples
were selected for comparison. If an employer rebuts a prima facie case
of discrimination by successfully attacking the statistical methodology,
the employer may also succeed in demonstrating the absence of any
disparity. For example, assume a group of minority schoolteachers al-
leging discrimination offered evidence that there was a gross disparity
between the percentage of minority teachers employed in a school dis-
trict and the percentage of minority students in that district. The school
district might rebut this evidence of discrimination by arguing that the
correct sample for comparison should be the percentage of qualified
minority applicants in the local work force, not the percentage of stu-
dents."' If the school district's argument were accepted, the employer
78 This Comment draws an analogy to the use of statistics in disparate treatment
actions because these actions, unlike disparate impact actions, involve "an overall attack
on the results of hiring without any focus on particular employment rules or proce-
dures." C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 32 (1980). An employer attempting to satisfy the
Weber test is not concerned with any particular employment practice, but rather with
demonstrating a pattern or history of segregation. For this reason the analogy to dispa-
rate treatment actions seems more appropriate. It should be noted, however, that statis-
tics are also used to establish a prima facie case in disparate impact actions, and there
is much overlap between the use of statistics in disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact actions. See id. at 30-33.
79 By definition a prima facie case of discrimination establishes an arguable viola-
tion. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (prima facie case creates a presumption of unlawful
discrimination); Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (prima facie
case raises an inference of discrimination). The Johnson court used the terms "prima
facie violation" and "arguable violation" interchangeably. See Johnson, 770 F.2d at
758 n.5.
80 A comparison of the percentage of schoolteachers to the percentage of minority
students in a school district has been rejected by the Supreme Court where the compar-
ison was used by a school district to show an absence of discrimination. See Hazelwood,
433 U.S. at 303, 308. One circuit court permitted such a comparison where it was used
as evidence of underrepresentation of minority schoolteachers in an equal protection
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would succeed not only in proving an absence of discrimination but also
in proving an absence of underrepresentation. Thus, the employer in
the traditional Title VII disparate action suit does not have to explain
an asserted statistical imbalance if it shows that there are no valid sta-
tistics to explain. The logic suggested above by the Tangren, Setser,
and Johnson courts succeeds only if the statistical sampling establishes
underrepresentation of minorities. The problems of statistical sampling,
which have been discussed extensively in disparate treatment litera-
ture,8 inhere in the use of statistics and will therefore be present in the
"reverse discrimination" setting as well.
Given that such problems can exist whenever statistical evidence is
used, disputes will inevitably arise as to the validity of the statistics
offered by employers seeking to justify the enactment of affirmative ac-
tion plans. It is necessary, therefore, to determine the proper allocation
of proof regarding the question of the validity of statistical evidence of
underrepresentation.
B. The Litigants' Roles in Weber Litigation
The reasoning suggested above is helpful in understanding how,
the parties to a reverse discrimination action would seek to use and to
attack the use of statistical evidence. After a nonminority plaintiff
brought suit alleging that an affirmative action plan was discrimina-
tory, an employer could defend its us of the plan by arguing that sta-
tistical evidence of a "manifest" or "conspicuous" underrepresentation
of minorities establishes an arguable Title VII violation,82 and there-
fore satisfies the more lenient Weber test. The only way to attack this
challenge to a school district's affirmative action plan. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 746 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985). It
remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will agree.
81 See, e.g., D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION
115-21 (1980) (discussing evaluation and specification of proxy populations in lieu of
applicant data); C. SULLIVAN, M. ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, supra note 78, at 25-29
(explaining ways the available labor pool figure can be manipulated); Boardman &
Vining, The Role of Probative Statistics in Employment Discrimination Cases, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 189, 193-201 (discussing five ways to sample the
number of minorities employed and four ways to sample the reference group in the
population at large).
82 This Comment does not attempt to define the magnitude of disparity necessary
to establish a "manifest" or "conspicuous" imbalance. In Weber 1.83% of the skilled
craftworkers were black, compared to a local work force that was 39% black. See
Weber, 443 U.S. at 198-99. The disparity inJanowiak was less severe-5.3% minori-
ties in the fire department compared to 14.1% in the population. See Janowiak, 750
F.2d at 558. In Johnson, all of the agency's 238 skilled craft positions were held by
men. See Johnson, 770 F.2d at 754. For a thorough discussion of the legal and statisti-
cal aspects of what constitutes a "significant" disparity in Title VII actions, see Board-
man & Vining, supra note 81, at 201-17.
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argument is to assert that the employer's statistics are insufficient to
establish manifest underrepresentation. Some evidence is needed to es-
tablish the validity of the employer's statistical sample. To require the
employer to establish the sample's validity, however, would be to force
the employer back on the tightrope: the employer could implicate itself
by providing statistical data that too strongly suggest that it has violated
Title VII. If an employer is forced to prove precisely the reliability of
its statistical data it will be exposing itself to the possibility of disparate
treatment suits by minority employees. By having to defend its selection
of a certain geographical pool or time frame, the employer could be
forced to demonstrate that it has discriminated. At the same time, how-
ever, such an employer should not be permitted to satisfy Weber with
statistics that are methodologically unsound.
The solution to this tension is to require that a nonminority plain-
tiff in a reverse discrimination suit play the role usually played by the
employer-defendant in a disparate treatment suit. Thus, if the em-
ployer in a reverse discrimination suit presents evidence of manifest
past and present underrepresentation of minorities in its work force, the
result should be a strong presumption that the job category is "tradi-
tionally segregated." The nonminority plaintiff can then rely on dispa-
rate treatment case law to rebut the presumption, arguing, for example,
that the employer compared its work force composition to an irrelevant
sample population."3
The role reversal analogy is not perfect. In a disparate treatment
action a minority plaintiff may use statistics to establish that the em-
ployer intended to discriminate.84 The employer may respond by argu-
ing that the statistical sampling, while demonstrating minority under-
representation, does not suggest intentional discrimination in violation
" For a discussion of what constitutes a "relevant" sample population, see Board-
man & Vining, supra note 81, at 193-201. The authors note that there is wide debate
over the choice of a sample of employees and a sample of the reference population. See
id. at 193. They categorize five possible ways to sample the "protected" minority
group: employer's total work force; work force at a particular level; recent hires to
whole firm; recent hires, assignments, or promotions to particular level, type, or divi-
sion; and candidates for hire or promotion. See id. at 196. Boardman and Vining then
describe four possible "reference" groups: general population, qualified work pool, ap-
plicant pool, and another level within the firm. Id. That there are 20 possible permuta-
tions of statistical comparisons, some of which are used more frequently and success-
fully than others, demonstrates that the use of statistics in employment discrimination is
unsettled. It is not the intent of this Comment to analyze the methods by which a
statistical sample can be attacked. The purpose of the analogy between Weber and
disparate treatment case law is to illustrate that a nonminority plaintiff can use existing
case law to challenge the validity of an employer's statistical sample.
8' See supra text accompanying notes 68-71.
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of Title VII.8 5 For example, if there were very few minority applicants
for a certain job, and the low application rate was not attributable to
any discriminatory acts by the employer, a court could find that there
was an underrepresentation of minorities but no intentional discrimina-
tion by the employer.
However, if a nonminority plaintiff in a reverse discrimination
suit were to play the role of the above employer by citing applicant
pool data in order to show that Weber was not satisfied, she would not
prevail. The role-playing analogy breaks down in such a case because
Weber does not require past discrimination by the employer in order to
justify an affirmative action plan. It is irrelevant to the Weber analysis
that a firm has no minority workers because none applied. A nofimi-
nority plaintiff responding to an employer's Weber defense must prove
that the statistics supplied by the employer are so flawed that they do
not show manifest underrepresentation at all. If a nonminority plaintiff
cannot rebut the employer's statistics by showing a flawed design, the
evidence of past and present underrepresentation of minorities must be
presumed to establish an arguable Title VII violation, and therefore a
traditionally segregated job category.
CONCLUSION
To immunize itself against a discrimination suit by a nonminority
plaintiff, an employer that has enacted an affirmative action plan must
satisfy Weber's requirement that the plan be designed to correct "mani-
fest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories." '86 Al-
though the employer bears the burden of establishing the validity of its
race-conscious plan, it is clear from the Weber Court's rejection of the
Fifth Circuit majority and dissenting opinions that the employer cannot
be required to establish its own actual past discrimination or arguable
violations of Title VII.
Circuit courts have disagreed, however, as to whether providing
evidence of underrepresentation of minorities in the relevant job cate-
gory satisfies the employer's burden. Justice Blackmun read the major-
ity opinion as sanctioning the use of evidence of minority under-
representation to justify an affirmative action plan,8 7 but the Janowiak
court, relying on the Weber majority's judicial notice of historical dis-
85 For examples of reasons why statistical evidence may not establish intentional
discrimination, see Note, Employment Discrimination-Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum &
Chemical Corp.: Does Title VII Limit Executive Order 11246?, 57 N.C.L. REv. 695,
716 n.105 (1979).
86 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
87 See id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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crimination by craft unions, required further evidence of past discrimi-
nation in the relevant job category.88 The Janowiak court failed to rec-
ognize the probative value of statistics in disparate treatment actions, in
which a prima facie case of discrimination can be established by the use
of statistical evidence of underrepresentation. Because a prima facie
case of discrimination in a disparate treatment action is equivalent to
an arguable violation, and because the Weber standard is less strict than
an arguable violation standard, several courts have concluded that sta-
tistical data that create a prima facie case of disparate treatment neces-
sarily satisfy Weber.89 These courts have improperly assumed, however,
that an employer's statistical methodology is necessarily sound.
Since an employer need not establish an arguable violation of Title
VII in order to enact a race-conscious plan, it cannot be forced to pro-
vide statistical support of its data that is so detailed as to implicate it in
discriminatory conduct. Rather, evidence of manifest past and present
underrepresentation should suffice to create a strong presumption that
the job category has traditionally been segregated, placing the burden
on the nonminority plaintiff to show that, because of errors in the sta-
tistical methodology, conspicuous underrepresentation cannot validly be
inferred. This approach to nonminority challenges to voluntarily en-
acted affirmative action plans avoids forcing employers onto the Title
VII tightrope.
88 See Janowiak, 750 F.2d at 562.
See Johnson, 770 F.2d at 758; Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962, 968 &
n.6 (8th Cir. 1981); Tangren v. Wackenhut Servs., 480 F. Supp. 539, 547 (D. Nev.
1979), affid, 658 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 916 (1982).
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